Découvert et transcrit par Francesco Saverio Nisio qui en a complété les références bibliographiques, ce texte, proposé en 1880 par le jeune Lucien Lévy à la Revue des études juives qui venait de se créer, et resté inédit depuis, met l’accent sur « l’exactitude et la profondeur des observations » psychologiques de Spinoza, « grand métaphysicien », c’est-à-dire « grand artiste », dans l’ Éthique.

Husserl develops his reflection on ethics mainly in his lecture courses. These lectures can be divided into two parts, according to a principle that is both chronological and pertaining to content, and following thus the respective editions in the Gesammelte Werke.1 The common aspect of the two different phases of Husserl’s research can be detected in the critical confrontation with Kant’s practical philosophy, starting with the question concerning the formality.

Cette lecture du livre de Gregory Cormann, Sartre. Une anthropologie politique. 1920-1980, est centrée sur la relation de Sartre avec Lucien Lévy-Bruhl sur le thème des émotions, développée dans son dernier chapitre. Cela conduit aussi à suggérer, sous ce rapport, un lien entre Günther Anders Stern e Sartre.

Nel suo celebre Principio speranza, Ernst Bloch interpreta il tema della speranza, autentico crocevia della modernitÀ, in una prospettiva di continuitÀ fra il cristianesimo ‘eretico' e il materialismo storico, nella quale il primo, per cosě dire, trae legittimitÀ dal secondo, come religione in ereditÀ. Prendendo in considerazione le teorie di Metz e Moltmann, che disegnano una ‘nuova teologia politica', si puň rintracciare in Bloch un'atipica ‘teologia politica'della speranza volta al futuro, in evidente contrasto con la ‘teologia politica' di Carl Schmitt (...) e con tutte le altre formulazioni politiche della Konservative Revolution, ‘religiosamente' volte al passato? (shrink)

La récente édition de l’inédit de jeunesse de Lévy-Bruhl sur la psychologie de Spinoza permet de donner tout son poids à la déclaration livrée beaucoup plus tard par l’historien de la philosophie moderne, dans une lettre à Evans-Pritchard, sur l’inscription de sa recherche dans un dialogue avec Spinoza et Hume. On relit cet inédit en soulignant l’importance de la logique des sentiments dans l’ Éthique, en mettant en relation l’appartenance de Spinoza au champ cartésien avec l’associationnisme de la tradition empiriste, (...) et on encadre ainsi l’œuvre de Lévy-Bruhl dans toutes ses phases. On esquisse également un parallèle avec Derrida, qui resterait à approfondir. (shrink)

On peut trouver dans l’œuvre de Lévy-Bruhl des traces de la présence de Spinoza, en particulier de sa conception de la connaissance du troisième genre, ou « science intuitive ». Il apparaît que Lévy-Bruhl a travaillé à une « new science of metaphysics », aussi bien dans ses œuvres d’histoire de la philosophie que dans ses ouvrages ethnologiques.One may find in Lévy-Bruhl’s works traces of Spinoza’s presence, in particular of his conception of « knowledge of the third kind », i.e. (...) « intuitive science ». It thus appears that Lévy-Bruhl worked on a « new science of metaphysics » both in his historical researches and in his ethnological works. (shrink)

Paragonare l'approccio di Husserl e Freud al conflitto tra filosofia della visione del mondo e il metodo della ricerca scientifica non solo è possibile, ma anche espostemologicamente sensato. In questo studio saranno presi in considerazione soprattutto due testi: Filosofia come scienza rigorosa di Edmund Husserl e le ultime conferenze di Sigmund Freud dedicate alla Introduzione alla psicoanalisi. Sia Husserl che Freud hanno sviluppato un approccio radicalmente negativo all'idea della “Weltanschauung”: in Freud questa concerne in primo luogo la sfera dell'ideologia religiosa (...) mentre in Husserl investe ogni sorta di relativismo, scetticismo e storicismo. Nonostante il comune giudizio negativo, bisogna riscontrare una profonda differenza tra i due autori: mentre Husserl lavora allo sviluppo di una "scienza filosofica" sostenuta dall'idea dell'intuizione eidetica, l'idea freudiana di scienza è basata sull'elaborazione intellettuale di quei fatti che vengono resi oggetto di osservazione. Questo significa inoltre che l'idea di scienza di Husserl mira a un livello sovra-temporale, mentre quello freudiano descrive una ricerca che, con tutti i suoi sforzi, resta senza fine e costantemente aperta alla dimensione del futuro. (shrink)

Discussion held in April at a Political Studies Association Roundtable in Manchester, England, on G. A. Cohen’s book If You’re an Egalitarian, How Come You’re So Rich?. --- Michael Otsuka's contribution sub-titled: "Il personale e politico? Il confine tra pubblico e private nella sfera della giustizia distributiva" = "Is the personal political? The boundary between the public and the private in the realm of distributive justice.".

L’articolo affronta gli interessi storico-artistici del letterato e storico Francesco Saverio Quadrio (Ponte in Valtellina 1695-Milano 1756), noto soprattutto per i suoi studi sulla storia della poesia e della sua terra natale, la Valtellina. Nei suoi libri Quadrio ha raccolto e combinato diverse informazioni anche su artisti e opere d’arte. Non tutte le notizie raccolte sono affidabili, ma i suoi studi sono comunque stati una delle fonti per l’aggiornamento di volumi importanti per la loro grande diffusione internazionale, come (...) gli studi di Johann Caspar Füssli o il famoso Dictionary of Painters Pilkington. Si è perciò cercato di comprendere il metodo di lavoro di Quadrio, indagando l’origine delle sue ipotesi, ma anche gli effetti di queste nella storiografia successiva. (shrink)

English version of: "Il personale e politico? Il confine fra pubblico e privato nella sfera della giustizia distributiva." --- Italian text published in Carter, Ian, Otsuka, Michael and Trincia, Francesco Saverio Discussione su "If You're an Egalitarian, How Come You're So Rich?" di G.A. Cohen. Iride, XIV. pp. 609-634. ISSN 1122-7893.

Understanding Institutions proposes a new unified theory of social institutions that combines the best insights of philosophers and social scientists who have written on this topic. Francesco Guala presents a theory that combines the features of three influential views of institutions: as equilibria of strategic games, as regulative rules, and as constitutive rules. -/- Guala explains key institutions like money, private property, and marriage, and develops a much-needed unification of equilibrium- and rules-based approaches. Although he uses game theory concepts, (...) the theory is presented in a simple, clear style that is accessible to a wide audience of scholars working in different fields. Outlining and discussing various implications of the unified theory, Guala addresses venerable issues such as reflexivity, realism, Verstehen, and fallibilism in the social sciences. He also critically analyses the theory of “looping effects” and “interactive kinds” defended by Ian Hacking, and asks whether it is possible to draw a demarcation between social and natural science using the criteria of causal and ontological dependence. Focusing on current debates about the definition of marriage, Guala shows how these abstract philosophical issues have important practical and political consequences. -/- Moving beyond specific cases to general models and principles, Understanding Institutions offers new perspectives on what institutions are, how they work, and what they can do for us. (shrink)

What is it for a car, a piece of art or a person to be good, bad or better than another? In this first book-length introduction to value theory, Francesco Orsi explores the nature of evaluative concepts used in everyday thinking and speech and in contemporary philosophical discourse. The various dimensions, structures and connections that value concepts express are interrogated with clarity and incision. -/- Orsi provides a systematic survey of both classic texts including Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Moore and (...) Ross and an array of contemporary theorists. The reader is guided through the moral maze of value theory with everyday examples and thought experiments. Rare stamps, Napoleon's hat, evil demons, and Kant's good will are all considered in order to probe our intuitions, question our own and philosophers' assumptions about value, and, ultimately, understand better what we want to say when we talk about value. -/- 1. Value and Normativity 1.1 Introduction 1.2 Which Evaluations? 1.3 The Idea of Value Theory 1.4 Value and Normativity 1.5 Overview 1.6 Meta-ethical Neutrality 1.7 Value Theory: The Questions -/- 2. Meet the Values: Intrinsic, Final & Co. 2.1 Introduction 2.2 Final and Unconditional Value: Some Philosophical Examples 2.3 Intrinsic Value and Final Value 2.4 The Reduction to Facts 2.5 Intrinsic and Conditional Value 2.6 Elimination of Extrinsic Value? 2.7 Summary -/- 3. The Challenge against Absolute Value 3.1 Introduction 3.2 Geach and Attributive Goodness 3.3 Foot and the Virtues 3.4 Thomson and Goodness in a Way 3.5 Zimmerman's Ethical Goodness 3.6 A Better Reply: Absolute Value and Fitting Attitudes 3.7 Summary -/- 4. Personal Value 4.1 Introduction 4.2 Moore on Good and Good For 4.3 Good For and Fitting Attitudes 4.4 Moore Strikes Back? 4.5 Agent-relative Value 4.6 Impersonal/Personal and Agent-neutral/Agent-relative 4.7 Summary -/- 5. The Chemistry of Value 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Supervenience and Other Relations 5.3 Organic Unities 5.4 Alternatives to Organic Unities: Virtual Value 5.5 Alternatives to Organic Unities: Conditional Value 5.6 Holism and Particularism 5.7 Summary -/- 6. Value Relations 6.1 Introduction 6.2 The Trichotomy Thesis and Incomparability 6.3 A Fitting Attitude Argument for Incomparability 6.4 Against Incomparability: Epistemic Limitations 6.5 Against Incomparability: Parity 6.6 Parity and Choice 6.7 Parity and Incomparability 6.8 Summary -/- 7. How Do I Favour Thee? 7.1 Introduction 7.2 Three Dimensions of Favouring 7.3 Responses to Value: Maximizing 7.4 Two Concepts of Intrinsic Value? 7.5 Summary -/- 8. Value and the Wrong Kind of Reasons 8.1 Introduction 8.2 The Fitting Attitude Account and its Rivals 8.3 The Wrong Kind of Reasons Problem 8.4 The Structure of the Problem and an Initial Response 8.5 Reasons for What? 8.6 Characteristic Concerns and Shared Reasons 8.7 Circular Path: No-Priority 8.8 Summary . (shrink)

The Risk of Freedom presents an in-depth analysis of the philosophy of Jan Patočka, one of the most influential Central European thinkers of the twentieth century, examining both the phenomenological and ethical-political aspects of his work. In particular, Francesco Tava takes an original approach to the problem of freedom, which represents a recurring theme in Patočka’s work, both in his early and later writings.Freedom is conceived of as a difficult and dangerous experience. In his deep analysis of this particular (...) problem, Tava identifies the authentic ethical content of Patočka’s work and clarifies its connections with phenomenology, history of philosophy, politics and dissidence. The Risk of Freedom retraces Patočka’s philosophical journey and elucidates its more problematic and less evident traits, such as his original ethical conception, his political ideals and his direct commitment as a dissident. (shrink)

We present and defend the Australian Plan semantics for negation. This is a comprehensive account, suitable for a variety of different logics. It is based on two ideas. The first is that negation is an exclusion-expressing device: we utter negations to express incompatibilities. The second is that, because incompatibility is modal, negation is a modal operator as well. It can, then, be modelled as a quantifier over points in frames, restricted by accessibility relations representing compatibilities and incompatibilities between such points. (...) We defuse a number of objections to this Plan, raised by supporters of the American Plan for negation, in which negation is handled via a many-valued semantics. We show that the Australian Plan has substantial advantages over the American Plan. (shrink)

'Ontology and Metaontology: A Contemporary Guide' is a clear and accessible survey of ontology, focussing on the most recent trends in the discipline. -/- Divided into parts, the first half characterizes metaontology: the discourse on the methodology of ontological inquiry, covering the main concepts, tools, and methods of the discipline, exploring the notions of being and existence, ontological commitment, paraphrase strategies, fictionalist strategies, and other metaontological questions. The second half considers a series of case studies, introducing and familiarizing the reader (...) with concrete examples of the latest research in the field. The basic sub-fields of ontology are covered here via an accessible and captivating exposition: events, properties, universals, abstract objects, possible worlds, material beings, mereology, fictional objects. -/- The guide's modular structure allows for a flexible approach to the subject, making it suitable for both undergraduates and postgraduates looking to better understand and apply the exciting developments and debates taking place in ontology today. (shrink)

Economists and biologists have proposed a distinction between two mechanisms – “strong” and “weak” reciprocity – that may explain the evolution of human sociality. Weak reciprocity theorists emphasize the benefits of long-term cooperation and the use of low-cost strategies to deter free-riders. Strong reciprocity theorists, in contrast, claim that cooperation in social dilemma games can be sustained by costly punishment mechanisms, even in one-shot and finitely repeated games. To support this claim, they have generated a large body of evidence concerning (...) the willingness of experimental subjects to punish uncooperative free-riders at a cost to themselves. In this article, I distinguish between a “narrow” and a “wide” reading of the experimental evidence. Under the narrow reading, punishment experiments are just useful devices to measure psychological propensities in controlled laboratory conditions. Under the wide reading, they replicate a mechanism that supports cooperation also in “real-world” situations outside the laboratory. I argue that the wide interpretation must be tested using a combination of laboratory data and evidence about cooperation “in the wild.” In spite of some often-repeated claims, there is no evidence that cooperation in the small egalitarian societies studied by anthropologists is enforced by means of costly punishment. Moreover, studies by economic and social historians show that social dilemmas in the wild are typically solved by institutions that coordinate punishment, reduce its cost, and extend the horizon of cooperation. The lack of field evidence for costly punishment suggests important constraints about what forms of cooperation can or cannot be sustained by means of decentralised policing. (shrink)

Recent debates on the nature of preferences in economics have typically assumed that they are to be interpreted either as behavioural regularities or as mental states. In this paper I challenge this dichotomy and argue that neither interpretation is consistent with scientific practice in choice theory and behavioural economics. Preferences are belief-dependent dispositions with a multiply realizable causal basis, which explains why economists are reluctant to make a commitment about their interpretation.

I present an approach to our conceiving absolute impossibilities—things which obtain at no possible world—in terms of ceteris paribus intentional operators: variably restricted quantifiers on possible and impossible worlds based on world similarity. The explicit content of a representation plays a role similar in some respects to the one of a ceteris paribus conditional antecedent. I discuss how such operators invalidate logical closure for conceivability, and how similarity works when impossible worlds are around. Unlike what happens with ceteris paribus counterfactual (...) conditionals, the closest worlds are relevantly closest belief-worlds: closest to how things are believed to be, rather than to how they are. Also, closeness takes into account apriority and the opacity of intentional contexts. (shrink)